Many natural language understanding tasks require lexicons that can support extensive lexically-based inferencing. To represent lexical semantics, most existing natural language understanding systems utilize Standard First Order Logic (FOL), or a subset of it. We argue that using a representation richer than FOL would facilitate better lexically-based inferencing. Using examples drawn from actual task-oriented spoken dialogues, we motivate the addition of restricted quanti cation and non-standard quanti ers, modal operators, predicate modi cation, and predicate nominalization. Although these additions are not new to the computational semantics literature, their motivation from the semantics of open class words is.
Introduction
Natural language understanding applications such as interactive planning Allen et al., 1994] and face-to-face translation Kay et al., 1994] require extensive inferencing. Many of these inferences are based on the meaning of particular open class 1 words. Providing a representation that can support such lexically-based inferences is a primary concern of lexical semantics. 2 The representation language of rst order logic (FOL) has wellunderstood semantics and a multitude of inferencing systems have been implemented for it. Thus it is a prime candidate to serve as a lexical semantics representation. However, we argue that FOL, although a good starting point, needs to be extended before it can e ciently and concisely support all the lexically-based inferences needed. 1 Open class words are those that are either adjectives, adverbs, nouns, or verbs. Closed class words are prepositions, determiners, conjunctions, etc.
2 Lexical semantics is also concerned with issues besides supporting inference. A prominent line of research in lexical semantics concerns itself with the link between a verb's meaning and its syntactic characteristics (see Levin, 1985] ).
Most lexical semantics representation systems utilize either KL-ONE-inspired terminological logics Bobrow and Webber, 1980; Alshawi, 1987; Herzog and Rollinger, 1991; Kuhlen, 1983] or typed feature structure (TFS) logics Copestake et al., 1993; Copestake and Briscoe, 1992] . Representationally, terminological logics are subsets of FOL Nebel and Smolka, 1991; Schmolze and Israel, 1983; Brachman and Levesque, 1984; Schubert, 1990; Hayes, 1979] as are TFS logics Nebel and Smolka, 1991; Kasper and Rounds, 1986; Johnson, 1987; Smolka, 1991] . 3 Thus, we suggest that lexical semanticists interested in supporting lexically-based inferences need to look for ways to enrich their representational systems. We are not alone in this suggestion (see Burkert and Forster, 1992; Pletat, 1991; Mercer, 1992] ). However, to our knowledge the speci c extensions we suggest are novel to the lexical semantics literature.
Most of the examples on which we base our arguments are from an interactive planning dialogue understanding project: the TRAINS project Allen et al., 1994]. The goal of the TRAINS project is to build a system that can assist a human manager who is attempting to solve a planning problem. The domain includes trains, rail connections, goods, cities, factories, etc. The computer system will have knowledge about the current state of the world, schedules, timetables, and other relevant information and will interact with the manager in spoken English. A typical planning problem would be to deliver 1000 gallons of orange juice to a speci c city by a certain time. To solve this problem the manager would be assisted by the system in scheduling the delivery of the oranges to the orange juice factory and the subsequent shipping of juice to the designated city.
A prototype of the system has been implemented (see Allen et al., 1994] ). In addition, actual dialogues have been collected in which the role of the system is played by a human in order to determine what natural dialogues are like (see Gross, 1993] ). By relying mostly on examples taken from these dialogues, we illustrate the relevance of the issues we address to mundane, naturally occurring discourse. Moreover, the dialogues provide a task-oriented context in which it is generally clear what inferences are required for understanding a given utterance; thus they provide a more constrained framework for semantic theorizing and experimentation than unrestricted texts or dialogues.
Before we can proceed we need to specify what are and what are not lexically-based inferences. A lexically-based inference is one that depends on a lexical axiom. A lexical axiom is one that involves a semantic atom that is the translation of an open class word (assuming a meaning postulate approach). The following axiom is a lexical axiom and links the verb enter with its result state (using the predicate modi er result-state).
(1) 8x8y result-state(enter(x; y)) contained-in(x; y)]
Using it, we could make a lexically-based inference from the boxcar entered the factory that the boxcar is in the factory. Furthermore, this inference is based on the word enter and not on the word boxcar. Such inferences can be contrasted with \structural" inferences such as in (2): (2) there are at least three cities with orange juice factories and large train stations ! there are at least three cities with orange juice factories This depends on properties of certain classes of logical operators, speci cally the class of upward monotone quanti ers Barwise and Cooper, 1981] and the conjunction operator, rather than on the lexical semantics of speci c open-class words. Note that if one substitutes the downward monotone quanti er fewer than three for at least three the inference no longer follows.
Besides distinguishing lexically-based inferences from structural ones, we also intend to distinguish them from inferences based on world knowledge. Without getting too embroiled in the issue of whether there is a formal and sharp distinction between knowledge about lexical meanings and world knowledge, we want to identify lexical knowledge with the sort of knowledge usually treated as terminological knowledge in KR systems. Ultimately a formal distinction may require use of a necessity-like modal operator in axioms like (1), to capture the truth of such axioms in all worlds (or situations), but we set aside this issue here.
2 Extensions to FOL needed to support lexically-based inferences In this section we will introduce a number of extensions to FOL and provide examples that motivate them. More speci cally, one should add restricted quanti cation and nonstandard quanti ers, modal operators, predicate modi cation, and predicate nominalization. These representational tools are available in some systems for sentence-level semantics Hwang and Schubert, 1993a; Moore, 1981; Alshawi, 1989] .
It should be noted at the outset that each example used to motivate an extension can be handled in FOL. However, the use of FOL leads to complex and unnatural paraphrases of intuitively simple facts, makes the encoded knowledge harder for system developers to comprehend and modify, and complicates inference. By adding a small amount of expressive power, concise and comprehensible representations can be given which facilitate e cient inferencing.
In our examples, we distinguish direct and indirect motivation of speci c extensions to FOL; i.e., a lexical item may directly correspond to a type of operator (such as predicate modi ers) unavailable in FOL, and it may indirectly involve nonstandard operators through its axiomatization.
Non-standard quanti ers and restricted quanti cation
We begin with an extension for which we cannot yet muster much evidence from TRAINS. However, non-standard quanti ers and restricted quanti cation can be motivated from a more general perspective and are commonly used for representing sentence-level semantics.
Previously, when circumscribing lexically-based inferences, we mentioned upward monotone quanti ers. These include at least three (see (2)), all, a few, most, etc. Such examples motivate the augmentation of FOL with corresponding nonstandard quanti ers; and the nominals with which they combine (as in at least three cities with orange juice factories) motivate the inclusion of formulas restricting the domains of the quanti ed variables. 4 . By utilizing these extensions, the following axiom enables inferences like the one in (2) to be made e ciently (i.e., in one step).
(3) For all upward monotone quanti ers Q and all predicates P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 :
Note that no reasoning about cardinality is required. This is in contrast to FOL: assuming a nite domain, something like the logical form in (4) for there are at least three cities with orange juice factories and large train stations and the axioms in (5) for cardinality would be required to support the information in FOL. It addition, multiple reasoning steps would be required.
(4) 9 x card(x) 38 y in(y; x) city(y)9 z have(y; z)^ojfactory(z)]9 z1 have(y; z1)^trainstation(z1)^large(z1)]]]]
(5) a. 8x(card(x) = 0) :(9y in(y; x)) b. 8x(card(x) = 1) 9y in(y; x)^8z in(z; x) z = y]] c. 8x; y(card(x) = y^y > 0) 9z card(z) = 1^card(x ? z) + 1 = card(x)]]
As a direct motivation for a nonstandard quanti er syntax, the above argument pertains only to the closed category of determiners (in combination with certain adverbs and numeral adjectives). However, it it clear that this syntax will also simplify the axiomatization of many open-class words. As a constructed (but uncontrived) example consider (6) and assume that the system has in its knowledge base that the majority of cars are tankers and are in Elmira (6) M: Are the majority of the cars tankers? It should be able to infer that the majority are tankers. By using the axiom below and a suitable treatment of conjunction, the system could make use of the axioms for upward monotone quanti ers.
(7) 8a; b majority(a; b) Most z : z 2 a] z 2 b] In the above axiom we assume that a and b denote collections and that 2 has been appropriately axiomatized.
Some other words that would bene t from non-standard quanti ers and restricted quanti cation are scarce, rare, minority, scant, and predominate. We also expect that degree adjectives such as expensive, di cult, or intelligent will require axiomatizations involving nonstandard, restricted quanti ers. For example, a di cult problem in the TRAINS domain is one that exacts more time and e ort from the problem solver(s) than most problems in this domain. Similarly dispositional adjectives such as perishable or fragile and frequency adverbs such as usually also call for restricted nonstandard quantication in their axiomatization, since they require a quanti cation other than over events of a certain type that is neither existential or universal.
Modal operators (or modal predicates)
Standard FOL has di culty representing necessity, possibility and propositional attitudes. For example, it is not possible, directly, to di erentiate a closed formula that could be true from one that could never be true. There is no built in conception of possible world nor is it possible to apply a predicate to a closed formula since a closed formula does not denote an individual in the ontology (it denotes a truth value). One can make worlds and propositions individuals of the ontology which correspond to terms in the logic and then axiomatize the relations between worlds, between propositions, and between closed formulas and propositions. However, this approach increases the complexity of the ontology and increases the complexity of the axiom set and thus makes it harder to maintain the system and to deduce things with it.
Modal logics were introduced to remedy this situation. They include operators whose interpretation involves possible worlds. And thus move the complexity out of the logic and syntactic proof system and into the model theory and interpretation function. A model structure with either possible worlds (e.g. Montague, 1974] ) or situations (e.g. Barwise and Perry, 1983] ) is required. Since the model theory for modal logics is well understood, this move is a win. For example, possibility can be encoded as an operator that applies to closed formulas and is interpreted as true if there exists a world accessible to the current one in which the formula is true.
Examples like (8) and (9) involve adverbs that are most naturally viewed as modal operators:
(8) M: That will probably work (9) M: Maybe we'll get lucky again In its context of occurrence, the second sentence refers to the possibility that all the orange juice needed for certain deliveries already exists, obviating the need for orange juice production. It would clearly be hazardous for the system to ignore the adverbs, turning mere wishful thinking into fact! Such examples provide direct motivation for allowing modal operators in lexical semantics. The argument is weakened by the fact that modal adverbs are somewhat marginal as an open class of lexical items; but we can also argue from adjectives such as reasonable, reliable, correct and right, and verbs such as found out that ..., said that ..., would like to ..., make sure ..., trying to ..., wonder if ..., believe, and assume. We restrict our further comments here to some observed uses of correct and reliable. For instance, in the following request for con rmation, the system should interpret correct as applying to the proposition that the time is 2 pm:
(10) M: The time is two pm { is that correct? Now if the system believes that the time is indeed 2 pm, it should surely infer an a rmative answer to the question { i.e., that it is correct that the time is 2 pm. Thus for the relevant sense of correct, the lexical semantics should tell the system that for any closed formula , (11) correct( ) .
If we adopt such a schema for the meaning of correct, we are treating it as a modal operator. An alternative is to assume that correct is a predicate, but one that applies to propositions. In turn, such an approach calls for the introduction of a reifying operator (such as that) for converting sentence contents (propositions) into individuals, allowing their use as predicate arguments. In either case, we are introducing a modal extension to FOL. The case of reliable is similar but more subtle. In actually occurring examples this property is often ascribed to items of information:
(12) M: That's reliable information Intuitively, reliable information is not necessarily correct, though it is necessarily wellfounded (i.e., there are good reasons for the presumption of truth). So the axiomatization is less trivial than (11) (and we omit details here), but it still calls for use of a modal operator or modal predicate in the same way.
Concerning indirect motivation for modals, an interesting example is compatible (with), as used in (13) M: So that sounds like a good temporary plan { let's see if it's compatible with our next objective here which is to deliver a boxcar of bananas to Corning
In order for the plan in (13) to be compatible with the additional banana delivery, it must be possible to realize both action types (within the given temporal and other constraints).
In general, (14) 8x; y action-type(x)^action-type(y)^compatible-with(x; y)] 39x 0 ; y 0 realize(x 0 ; x)^realize(y 0 ; y)]] :
(We comment on action types in a later subsection.) 3 entails that there exists a situation or possible world su ciently connected to the current one where is true. (Cf.
Dowty's use of the 3 operator in his treatment of the semantics of the su x -able Dowty, 1979 However, this treatment also has problems. Consider the pair of sentences below.
(16) a. Kim wrestled skillfully with Pat b. Pat wrestled awkwardly with Kim Using this treatment, the wrestling event would be both skillful and awkward at the same time. A workaround also exists for this problem but introduces further complexity. In contrast, treating modi ers like skillfully as predicate modi ers produces a more straightforward solution:
(17) Skillfully(wrestled-with)(Pat)(Kim) vs. Awkwardly(wrestled-with)(Kim)(Pat). Such adjectives do not occur in the TRAINS dialogues collected so far, and we will instead use certain verbs (make, get, look, sound, seem, begin, construct) as direct motivation for predicate modi ers.
For instance, the dialogues contain instances where the manager asks (18) M: Does that sound reasonable? (referring to a plan), or comments (19) M: Problem number two looks di cult. Now a plan can sound reasonable even if more careful analysis reveals it to be unreasonable. So the system should realize that an a rmative response to the query merely requires the absence of obvious aws in the plan (detectable with limited inferential e ort), rather than an actual proof of correctness.
One could attempt to handle such locutions by decomposing them into more complex modal patterns; e.g., x sounds P, for P a predicate, might be decomposed into something like \When one considers x, one (initially) feels that x is P". This is precisely the strategy that has often been suggested for for intensional verbs such as seeks. But while plausible de nitions (decompositions) exist for some intensional verbs, they are very di cult to contrive for ones like resemble (as in The one-horned goat resembled a unicorn) or imagine. A more general, straightforward approach is to add predicate modi ers to FOL. Thus the translation of sounds (when it takes an adjectival complement) would be a predicate modi er, whose meaning is constrained { but not de ned { by axioms like the following: 5
(20) For all monadic predicates P: 8xsounds(P)(x) 8s; t person(s)^consider(s; x; t) feel-that(s; P(x);end-of(t))]
where we are neglecting various subtleties for the sake of exposition. 6 Thus to answer (18), the system would make use of (20) to infer that it need only \consider" the plan in question, until it \feels-that" (i.e., tentatively concludes that) the plan is reasonable or otherwise.
Finally, we mention a third class of examples directly motivating predicate modi ers, namely certain VP adverbs such as almost, nearly and apparently. Again, these do not appear (as yet) in our corpus, but of course are common in other corpora. For example, the \pear stories" of Chafe Chafe, 1980] contain examples such as \ the boy on the bicycle] almost ran into a girl", where the desired inference is that he did not run into her, but came very close to her.
Predicate nominalization
By predicate nominalization we mean the formation of terms (denoting individuals in the domain of discourse) from predicates (denoting classes of objects, actions or events). In other words, predicate nominalization involves the rei cation of properties (inluding kinds/species, action types, and event types) by application of nominalizing (reifying) operators.
Our line of argument for allowing such operators in the logic employed for lexical semantics is less direct (but we hope no less convincing) than for the previous extensions. We claim that (i) many lexical entries correspond to predicates with one or more arguments ranging over kinds of things, properties, and actions/events (this already came up incidentally in (13)); and (ii) the lexical axioms describing these entries will either explicitly involve nominalized predicates or require the substitution of nominalized predicates when used for inference.
As examples of a variety of lexical predicates over (rei ed) action types, consider the italicized words in the following TRAINS excerpts. We have underlined corresponding action-type arguments where these are explicitly present. (21) M: What is the best way for me to accomplish my task ...
(22) S: That's a little beyond my abilities (23) S: The way it's going to work is, engine E2 is going to go to city E ... (24) S: Our current plan is to ll ... tankers T3 and T4 with beer ... (25) S: One other suggestion would be that you take the other tanker which isn't being used ... (26) M: That's not gonna work (27) S: Well that will delay departure (28) S: Right, we can begin production ... (29) M: ... send it o on a particular route and do it several times Clearly way, task, plan, and suggestion as used in (21 -25) are predicates over types of actions or events, as the underlined arguments con rm. For instance, the action descriptions underlined in (23) and (24) do not refer to particular future actions at particular times, but to types of actions whose eventual realization is hoped to solve the problem at hand. (And the ability deictically referred to in (22) is the ability to specify the best way for the manager to accomplish the current task in (21) { again an action type.) Similarly (26 -29) illustrate verbs whose subject or object ranges over action types. Note for instance in (27) that a particular departure event cannot be delayed { particular events have xed times of occurrence, but event types in general do not. Likewise in (29), only an action type, not a particular action, can be done \several times".
Similarly the following excerpts contain predicates over kinds/species, again with corresponding arguments underlined: (30) M: One boxcar of oranges is enough to produce the required amount of orange juice (31) M: And ll two tankers with beer (32) M: There's an] unlimited source of malt and hops ... Note that in (30) the underlined subject of enough refers to a kind of load or quantity, not to any particular load. Similarly the underlined objects of ll with and source of in (31) and (32) are kinds of stu , not particular realizations of them. (In fact, no particular batch of malt and hops could be \unlimited".)
Turning to the second step of our argumentation, concerning the explicit occurrence of nominalization operators in argument positions of predicates like those above, one very brief example will have to su ce here. Consider the sense of do with an action type as object, as in (29). Now to understand (29), the system will have to substitute a term for the action type, \send the train] o on a particular route", for the pronoun. To infer any further consequences, it will need a meaning postulate something like the following:
(33) For all monadic action predicates P: 8x do(Ka(P ))(x) P(x) where Ka rei es an action predicate (in this case, \send the train] o on a particular route"). It can then apply semantic and world knowledge about P to draw conclusions about the e ects of P(x) (in this case that the train will follow the route in question and reach its destination).
Conclusion
A popular goal for the future is to build intelligent agents that we can communicate with using natural language. If this goal is to be attained such agents will have to be able to perform complex inferencing. This will require lexicons that can support extensive lexically-based inferencing. In order to support these inferences, representations for lexical semantics will have to be richer than they are now. We have provided motivations for particular extensions, drawing many of the illustrations from actual dialogues in the TRAINS domain { a \practical" domain of the sort for which we can realistically endeavor to build an intelligent assistant.
Fortunately, the extensions of FOL for which we have argued are not new (as noted at the outset). Indeed, they are a subset of the extensions that are available in Episodic Logic (EL) Hwang and Schubert, 1993a; Hwang and Schubert, 1993b] , a logic designed to be expressively and inferentially adequate as both a logical form for natural language and as a general representation for commonsense knowledge. Similar formalisms are those used in the Core Language Engine Alshawi, 1987; Alshawi, 1989] and Nerbonne and Laubsch's NLL Laubsch and Nerbonne, 1991; Nerbonne, 1992] . EL is an intensional, situational extension of FOL that provides a systematic syntax and formal semantics for sentence and predicate nominalization (rei cation), sentence and predicate modi cation, nonstandard restricted quanti ers, -abstraction, and pairing of arbitrary sentences with situation-(episode-) denoting terms (where those sentences are interpreted as describing or characterizing those situations).
Inference in EL has been shown to be practical through the EPILOG implementation Schae er et al., 1993] , with examples ranging from fairy tale fragments and aircraft maintenance reports Hwang and Schubert, 1993a; Hwang and Schubert, 1993b ] to the Steamroller theorem-proving problem. As well, EL as been used as the front-end logical form in the TRAINS system Allen et al., 1994]. A gratifying conclusion from the text understanding experiments is that increased expressiveness often simpli es inference, allowing conclusions to be drawn in one or two steps that would require numerous steps in an FOL \reduction" of the same information. Finally, EL has been used as a representation for forming hypotheses about meanings of derived words, such as reload (given a lexical entry for load), and performance (given a lexical entry for perform) Light, 1996] . As might be expected, the representational requirements for expressing such hypotheses are very similar to those we have pointed out here.
By allowing the same exibility in the representation of lexical semantics as is provided by logics like EL for sentence-level semantics, we should be able to combine lexical semantic knowledge with world knowledge in a uniform, integrated fashion to achieve understanding at least in restricted, task-oriented domains.
